LEGAL UPDATE
FEATURING COMMENTS ON IMPORTANT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
Appellate Court Clarifies The Admissibility of Common Practice Evidence
The Connecticut Appellate Court recently clarified the admissibility of common practice evidence in Deegan v. Simmons, 100 Conn.App. 524, 918 A.2d 998 (April 17, 2007). Deegan involved litigation of a two car motor vehicle accident which resulted in a defense
verdict. On appeal, the Plaintiffs claimed that the trial court improperly admitted evidence concerning the speeds at which other motorists customarily drive on the road in question, and allowed a police officer to testify as to the circumstances in which he would
issue tickets to motorists.
Prior to Deegan, the general rule of law when considering evidence of a common practice or scheme was that a party charged with negligent conduct would not be allowed to show that such conduct was common or customary among those placed under like circumstances and owing the same duties. The standard to determine whether such evidence was admissible was whether it would be of sufficient assistance in determining the ultimate question of negligence to make it properly admissible in view of the collateral issues which may be raised, and the danger of its misuse. Eamiello v. Piscitelli, 133 Conn. 360 (1947).
In Deegan, the Appellate Court clarified this standard by holding that "[a] common practice or custom is not permitted to be shown for the purpose of establishing... the standard upon the basis of which conduct is to be held negligent or not negligent, but merely as evidence for the assistance of the trier of fact in determining whether the conduct of the person charged with negligence was in the particular situation that of a reasonably prudent person". Id. 367-68.
The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court held that the jury was fully capable of determining whether the defendant was traveling at an unreasonable rate of speed at the time of the accident, and that the issue was not beyond the common knowledge or experience of a jury or so complicated a problem as to require evidence of custom and practice to assist the jury.
The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court's evidentiary ruling was both improper and harmful as it permitted the defendants to present opinion evidence on an ultimate issue, which is a question for the jury to determine. Like the court in Eamiello, the Appellate Court was concerned that the jury may give too much weight to the custom or practice evidence and not enough weight to experts qualified to testify as to the speed vehicles were traveling upon impact.
In light of Deegan, it seems that evidence of a common practice or scheme will be admissible only where such evidence educates the jury as to matters beyond its common knowledge or experience, yet and where such evidence will not unduly influence the jury.
Christopher M. Russo, Esq.
crusso@gmflaw.com
This newsletter is published by the firm of Gordon, Muir &Foley, LLP. The views, analysis and developments in the law that are reported and offered in this issue are intended to educate and assist lay persons in recognizing legal problems. They are neither intended as individual legal advice nor offered as a general solution to all apparently similar individual problems. Readers are cautioned not to attempt to solve their individual problems solely on the basis of the information contained herein, and are urged to seek legal advice for answers to specific problems. If you would like further advice regarding this or other employment related issues, please contact us at 860-525-5361, © 2005 Gordon, Muir & Foley, LLP.
